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ABSTRACT
In its efforts to integrate newly entering migrants into their societies, Europe has
established integration policies that negatively impact these migrants, especially those
from racialized backgrounds. The policies mask an agenda of securitization against
outsiders who are falsely considered to be a danger to national security and national
identity. Since the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center in the United States, many
Western countries, including European countries, began to build a culture of fear
against Muslims. Europe began to increasingly associate migrants with problems such
as trafficking, radicalization, and terrorism. As a result, Europe began to treat migration
as a security issue and migrants as the targets of the security policies. Governments
established integration policies and citizenship laws so difficult that migrants began to
find it harder to integrate, contributing to a genuine feeling of exclusion from society.
Additionally, security forces were given the responsibility of vetting migrants and
determining who could enter European states and who could not. Slowly, Muslim
migrants came to be associated with criminality and danger. European governments
allowed security forces to monitor Muslim migrants, fearing their radicalization, and
allowed raids to take place against Muslims’ homes and cultural spaces. Furthermore,
European countries established legislations banning religious symbols, a move done to
hide the true intention of banning the Muslim veil, making it difficult for Muslim
women from practicing a normal life while wearing the veil. While theoretically they
seem to be advocating for migrants and their inclusion, in practice, through their
security-infused integration policies, Europe has targeted Muslim migrants in a new
security regime, specifically tailored for migration.
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Introduction
W. E. B. Du Bois, historian, sociologist, and civil rights activist, wrote on
stigmatization saying, “the facing of so vast a prejudice could not but bring the
inevitable self-questioning, self-disparagement, and lowering of ideals which even
accompany repression and breed in an atmosphere of contempt and hate.”1 He was
explaining the struggles of African Americans who were questioning whether it was
necessary for them to reject their identity to become American and whether this
rejection should be considered their duty as American citizens. The context in which
Du Bois was writing was specific to African Americans and their struggles, however,
his writing resonates with many people of different races, ethnicities, religions, and
even cultures. It is not uncommon to find that minorities are treated differently or
suspiciously in different societies. In the Americas, Irish immigrants were considered
too “brown” and were suspected of spying for the Vatican, Asian Americans were
considered ineligible for citizenship, until 1952, because they were considered aliens,
and Jewish Americans were denied voting rights because they were not perceived as
full Americans.2 Similar events occurred in Europe where riots broke out between
French workers and Italian immigrants in the early 1880s and early 1890s and antiSemitic massacres in Russia in the 1880s.3 It is therefore not surprising that similar
incidents take place today, albeit in less physically violent ways and more subtle ways.
More recently, during the 1990s, migrants have been treated more suspiciously by both
the media and the general public, compared to earlier periods where they were able to
assimilate easier, and governments responded by associating migrants and migration
policies to public issues and disorders.4 This association resulted in an agenda by which
governments established integration policies and citizenship laws which migrants find
very difficult to adapt to making it difficult, if not impossible, for them to assimilate in
new societies. Europe has been the desired destination for many migrants, escaping
economic or political hardships in their countries of origin. Western Europe in
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particular is often considered one of the ideal regions where people who are having
troubles in their home countries can go to receive more opportunities. This phenomenon
is not new or even recent, in fact Europe has been accepting labour migrants for decades
because of the limited skilled labour available domestically. However, in more recent
years the number of migrants increased exponentially due to domestic conflicts, lack
of economic opportunities, and societal problems elsewhere in the world, which people
attempt to escape through migration. When it comes to refugees particularly, some
choose to travel to the receiving countries legally, going through the proper channels,
while others, who do not have the resources, travel illegally hoping that the risk they
are taking and the obstacles they encounter will pay off. However, Europe’s response
to those who attempt to travel legally is not necessarily welcoming. In fact, in recent
years European countries have established policies making it harder for people to enter
their borders and policies that make it harder for migrants already within the borders to
integrate or become naturalized citizens. In recent decades, migration became
associated with security issues because it is believed to be a danger to public order and
the national identity. European countries have linked migrants to issues such as
terrorism and trafficking. In response, the policies established by governments give
privileges to nationals while excluding migrants, and policies which limit the ability of
migrants to live in these societies.5 This agenda is political in the sense that
governments and political parties associate security issues with migrants and therefore
campaign for crackdowns against migrants, and it has also become legal, where
governments pass legislations limiting the abilities of migrants from living peacefully
if they do not conform to certain conditions set by the countries. In Europe, the term
‘immigrant’ has become linked to the Muslim identity.6 It is therefore not surprising
that the security agenda in Europe has been increasingly targeting Muslims. The
European public has determined that religious practices different from theirs are a threat
to their way of life.7 And while many in Europe do prescribe to the Muslim faith, they
are often treated with suspicion and derogation because their faith is almost always
associated with negative connotations such as radicalism, fundamentalism, terrorism,
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and public disorder. The European public also believes that Muslim migrants in Europe
may not be as loyal to their country of residence as they should be. In fact, when asked
if they believed that Muslims living in the country were loyal to it, thirty-five percent
of the French public, forty-five percent of the German public, and forty-nine percent of
the British public answered that they did not believe Muslims were loyal.8 Similarly,
those who believed that it was necessary to be less expressive when it comes to religion
in order to properly integrate were between thirty to forty percent in each of the three
countries.9 This is an indication of how Muslims in Europe are considered a threat to
the European identity and it also shows how proper and complete integration is
associated with less expressions of religion. Consequently, European governments
have associated Muslims and Islam in general with security problems that require
securitization. This thesis argues that European policies towards migrants, established
under the guise of integrating migrants into European societies and easing the transition
for their future, were in fact used to exclude and securitize Muslim migrants. It outlines
the different interrelated approaches taken by the European Union in order to integrate
migrants through integration policies and citizenship laws that appear to be in favour
of integration and which demonstrates the European Union’s desired integrated society
but which in fact contain many problems and harsher conditions making it more
difficult for migrants to integrate while simultaneously allowing security forces more
powers against migrants. Chapter 1 defines certain key terms which creates the path by
which this thesis moves towards explaining how racism, fascism, xeno-racism, and
institutional racism take place in European countries and how these phenomena
continue to manifest against migrants today. Chapter 2 focuses on integration policies
and citizenship laws in the European Union. This chapter briefly shows a history of
migration in Europe then delves into the exclusionary reforms of integration policies
and citizenship laws. First, it looks at the right to asylum-seeking and how it has been
received by Europe, its correlation to trafficking, and the shifts in policy and
legislations towards control and exclusion in response to asylum-seeking. Next, the
chapter examines the European Union’s approach to integration of immigrants through
the different steps and policies the European Union has taken and continues to take
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which, on the surface, appear to be promoting the importance of integrating migrants.
Then it examines how Europe began to practice exclusion more broadly within its
integration policies and citizenship laws by showing how the policies are fraught with
problems making them difficult to implement. This is accomplished by looking at some
of these policies and laws in different countries and how each country had its own
method by which they chose to make it harder for migrants to integrate or for them to
become naturalized citizens. . Chapter 3 looks at the different aspects of securitization
against Muslim migrants. Europe has often made the claim that Muslims are associated
with terrorism and jihadi groups and this chapter shows how Europe has made use of
these claims and used them to securitize and exclude Muslim migrants, rather than
properly accept them and integrate them. The chapter first explores the securitization
of Muslims in educational institutions. This is outlined in the example of ‘The Case of
the Nottingham Two’ which shows the structural racism of academic institutions in the
UK. The chapter then goes on to examine the securitization of Muslim migrants in other
spaces such as their homes or mosques. It offers examples of how security forces
labelled Muslims as terrorist or jihadis, how the media took up this label, and the
resulting raids undertaken against Muslims based on little to no evidence. Finally, the
chapter explores one gendered policy which specifically affects and securitizes female
Muslim migrants, the veil ban. It outlines Europe’s response to the veil historically, and
how Europe deals with the veil as an oppressive symbol that must be eliminated. It
looks at the experiences of Muslim women wearing the veil and how they were
excluded, and sometimes even shunned, from their schools, universities, and even
workplaces. It also looks at the legal responses of European courts in cases of religious
freedom and freedom of expression pertaining to the veil, and the subsequent effect
these responses had on some governments, such as in Germany. This chapter outlines
the different ways and the different places where Muslim migrants have been
securitized and excluded. Finally, the conclusion attempts to combine how the
integration policies and citizenship laws, with their harsh conditions and exclusionary
standards, have contributed to this securitization. It shows how the policies instated by
Europe were severely unrealistic to the extent that they had begun the exclusionary
process before the securitization, and it is because these migrants were excluded from
the society that they became targets of the securitization. By looking at the Europe’s
colonial history combined with the change in Europe’s response to migration, this thesis
4

outline how law and policy have been used as tools to advance Europe’s securitization
agenda against Muslim migrants and how Europe has responded to certain violations
of human rights be creating legislations that will justify these violations.
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I: Racism, Fascism, and Xeno-racism in Europe
Much of Europe’s current history and practices are of a neo-colonial nature. The
colonial period brought capitalism into Europe, and with the development of a capitalist
system in Europe, certain ideologies began to spread, including racism.10 The
exploitation of labour used to advance European society brought a system of oppression
which took on a racist form that could not be separated from the economic oppression.
Intending to show that race, while not the main factor for imperialism or colonialism,
is still a major factor that cannot be treated as a coincidence, C. L. R. James, historian
and Pan-Africanist stated that, “… to think of imperialism in terms of race is disastrous.
But to neglect the racial factor as merely incidental is an error only less grave than to
make it fundamental.”11 Therefore, it is not surprising to claim that today Europe
practices some forms of racism, even if not as explicitly as it did in the past. The
ideologies embraced by European countries have done little to eliminate ethnic, racial,
gender, or class discrimination, and neoliberal policies in the EU often created a
disadvantage for a specifically defined group of people.12 This is true for the minorities
who often find themselves excluded from the state’s protection or policies and it is also
true of the groups who are often targeted, by both the state and the general public, under
misguided notions that they do not belong or that they are disrupting the public order.
Migrants in Europe suffer from this treatment, regardless of the reason they travel to
Europe, and Muslim migrants suffer even more because of their chosen identity, where
they experience exclusion, derogation, and even securitization. The legacy left behind
by colonialism meant that migrants, especially those coming from minority
backgrounds, felt like outsiders when traveling to Europe. When asked about what
identity he would attribute to himself one individual said, “I would never say I am
English because I am not…. You have to look at what makes up that identity being
Muslim [sic] how many times do you hear about Britain accepting Muslims as part of
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their community.”13 This feeling of exclusion experienced by minorities, and the
subsequent securitization they face because of it, is not only due to the general racism
that still exists in Europe but also because of the differences between Europeans and
migrants, physical and otherwise, which makes Europe hesitant about accepting
migrants, and more prone to ostracizing them.
There are three major forms of discrimination, practiced by Europe, that are
relevant to this thesis. These three forms are racism, fascism, and xeno-racism. In 1985,
following several examples of discriminatory behaviour in different European
countries, the European Parliament formed a committee titled ‘Committee of Inquiry
into the Rise of Fascism and Racism in Europe’ (hereinafter the Committee of Inquiry).
This Committee produced a report defining the two terms, racism and fascism,
outlining certain examples of how Europe has engaged in these practices and how some
remnants continue to linger, and some recommendation on how to address these
problems. In their effort to define fascism, experts outlined several different themes
believing they were crucial in coming up with a definition, such as virulent nationalism,
xenophobia and racial superiority, and they presented these themes to the Committee.14
Additionally, experts also recommended that the term should be used within a historical
perspective, for example confining its usage to the periods in inter-war Europe when
the term was used to describe certain active movements.15 The Committee of Inquiry
also adopted a two-fold definition of racism. The first part of the definition can be found
in the Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice, adopted by the United Nations
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) General Conference
in 1978. This definition stems from the idea that there is no scientific basis to prove
that any one race is superior to another, and consequently no one race is inferior to
another.16 The second part of the definition comes from the International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. This definition identifies the
types of discrimination, including the common ones such as race and colour, and also

13

Yasmin Hussain & Paul Bagguley, Citizenship, Ethnicity and Identity: British Pakistanis after the
2001 ‘Riots’ 39 SOCIOLOGY 407, 415 (2005).
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adds some other categories such as birth, national origins, and ethnic origins.17
However, using the term racism can sometimes fail to express the various problems
that arise. This prompted the use of the term racialization instead of racism because it
provided a more multi-layered and multi-dimensional frame of what racism involves.
Using the term racialization instead of racism allows for an intersectional analysis and
places the individual in multiple positions, therefore looking at different forms of
identity such as race, ethnicity, gender or class combined thus looking at how
discrimination can produce complex social relations. This in turn also allows for
avoiding the more simplistic binary understanding of racism.18 In addition, and for the
purpose of this thesis, it is important to define institutional racism as this is one of the
main forms of racism tackled. Institutional racism is the inability of an organization to
provide services to people due to their race, culture or ethnic origin.19 As for xenoracism, it was defined by A. Sivanandan, emeritus director of the Institute of Race
Relations:
It is a racism that it not just directed at those with darker skins,
from the former colonial territories, but at the newer categories of
the displaced, the dispossessed and the uprooted, who are beating
at western Europe’s door, the Europe that helped to displace them
in the first place. It is a racism, that is, that cannot be colour-coded,
directed as it is at poor whites as well, and is therefore passed off
as xenophobia, a ‘natural’ fear of strangers. But in the way it
denigrates and reifies people before segregating and/or expelling
them, it is a xenophobia that bears all the marks of the old racism.
It is racism in substance, but ‘xeno’ in form. It is a racism that is
meted out to impoverished strangers even if they are white. It is
xeno-racism.20
The above definitions explain the different experiences faced by Muslim
migrants who travel to Europe. Many practices that take place in Europe by the state
and/or society fall within the definitions of racism, fascism, and xeno-racism. In fact,

17

Id., ¶ 39.
Coretta Phillips, Institutional Racism and Ethnic Inequalities: An Expanded Multilevel Framework,
40 J. SOC. POLICY, 173, 174-5 (2011); Ali Rattansi, The Uses of Racialization: The Time-spaces and
Subject-objects of the Raced Body, in RACIALIZATION: STUDIES IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 271, 271
(Karim Murji and John Solomos ed., 2005).
19
Floya Anthias, Institutional Racism, Power and Accountability, 4 Sociological Research Online ¶ 2.1
(1999).
20
LIZ FEKETE, The Emergence of Xeno-Racism, in A SUITABLE ENEMY RACISM MIGRATION, AND
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18
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the establishment of the European Union (hereinafter the EU) implies a form of
discrimination based on national origin through the separation of nationals of member
states from nationals of non-member states.21 This in turn lead to the establishment of
a European identity, one in which outsiders, those who are not white or secular or
Christian are considered not European. The distinction this made between European
and non-European resulted in a perceived illegitimacy in terms of residency, cultural,
social, and political rights, and even resulted in repressive national policies limiting
rights of residency and travel.22 Several members of the EU were creating massive
regularizations and others were establishing repressive legislation regarding borders
and the entry and exit of foreigners.23 This combined with the integration policies and
citizenship laws established by several European members of the EU illustrate how
racism affects Muslim migrants traveling into Europe. Not only that, but several
European countries have experienced a resurgence of right-wing and fascist groups.
Countries such as the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and Greece
have right-wing regimes, extremist groups or neo-Nazi and pro-Nazi tendencies. And
it was not only fascism that Europe practiced, but it also practiced xeno-racism, most
commonly on migrants, but also on ethnic minorities such as the Roma people.24
The Roma were originally Indo-Aryan travellers who increasingly migrated
from northern India to Europe but nowadays the Roma make up Europe’s largest ethnic
minority, and most hold citizenship from a country belonging to the EU.25 With the
increasing fascist and right-wing political groups in European countries, the Roma have
also become targets of racial profiling and violence often being displaced and evicted
or subjected to racist leaflets associating them with terms such as ‘delinquency’ and
‘vandalism’.26 The fact that the Roma people were considered different from majority
citizens made them subjects of xeno-racism. Discrimination in Europe does not target
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only those from different religions such as the Nazis against the Jews or different races
or other common discriminatory identifications such as race or gender, but they also
target those in Europe, who hold European citizenship, but are too different, whether it
is because they speak different languages, belong to different ethnic groups or
otherwise. This is where xeno-racism comes to play in Europe, where even those who
belong or identify as being European are targeted because they are impoverished or
because they are ethnically different. Muslims in Europe, while not exactly struggling
the same way as the Roma people, do experience similar issues. Muslims traveling to
Europe are often labelled criminals and terrorists because of their religion and their
non-conformity to European standards and identities and sometimes even Europeanborn Muslims feel excluded because they are believed to be too different, because of
their religion and because the majority do not see them as fully European. Europe
continues to practice the same racial profiling and discrimination it always has, but
now, instead of doing so through physical violence and war, it does so through
legislations, such as citizenship laws and the ban on religious symbols, and through
policies, such as integration policies, that are unfavourable towards migrants and make
it harder for them to be feel included in new societies.
It is also safe to say that while Europe has its own faults, and those of course
play a bigger role in its inclusion and integration policies, it is also deeply affected by
international incidents which can alter its perceptions and shift its focuses elsewhere.
The September 11, 2001 attacks (hereinafter 9/11 attacks) that took place in the United
States is one such example. The 9/11 attacks were a tragic incident, one which had so
many ramifications affecting different regions, even though the attacks themselves may
have taken place elsewhere. The so-called ‘War on Terror’ was announced and its main
enemy became those who adhere to the Muslim faith. Europe was one of the regions,
as an ally of the United States, which shifted its focus majorly towards addressing the
issues posed by foreigners entering its borders, and particularly those who are
Muslim.27 Counter-terrorism policies established by the EUpost-9/11 redefined
terrorism, a definition which disguised xeno-racism it practiced under the guise of

27
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national security.28 Europe’s response to the 9/11 attacks was so disproportionate that
their counter-terrorism policies targeted anti-globalization protests, animal rights
activism and other movements so far removed from terrorist organizations and al
Qaida.29 The new definition of terrorist activities encompassed not only violence
perpetrated for political reasons but also included actions that would cause serious harm
to a country or an international organization or an action that would force a government
to behave in a certain manner.30 Europe used the wave of fear that arose from the 9/11
attacks to justify their newly established policies and the increasing securitization
against anything too foreign, especially migrants, to protect national security.31 In fact,
it was the recurring use of the phrase ‘national security’ that allowed Europe to get
away with racial profiling with little to no outcry from the public, because the public
would not argue in the face of a threat against the ‘national security’ or the ‘national
interests’ of the state.32 It did not help matters that the German authorities had found
out that the plans for the 9/11 attacks took place in Hamburg, and the July 7, 2005
London bombings certainly exasperated the case against Muslims even more.33
Muslims who have long settled in Europe, for decades, if not longer, have suddenly
become targeted. Even Muslims who held European citizenships or were Europeanborn were not exempt from the xeno-racism practiced by European countries both
because their faith has become the enemy when it comes to the ‘war on terror’ and
because they threaten the European identity.34 Islam was, since then, associated with
violence, aggression, and terrorism, which associated its adherents with the capability
of committing such actions.35 Europe also began questioning where the loyalties of its
Muslim residents lay, whether it was with the European states that hosted them or with
the faith that they adhere to. In fact, one individual commented that the lack of global
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outcry from Muslims over the 9/11 attack, signified that there was no struggle within
Islam over morality of certain actions, and this would result in a struggle between Islam
and the West.36 Muslim individuals and communities were increasingly targeted in the
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. One Muslim organization, the Islamic Human Rights
Commission, reported that in September 2001, around 206 incidents of violence and
other harmful acts were recorded in Britain.37 Britain passed an Anti-Terrorism, Crime
and Security Act in 2001 which included measures allowing special forces more power
to arrest and detain, and which included new illegal acts that would allow the courts in
the United Kingdom to deal with crimes occurring outside its national jurisdiction.
Furthermore, one section of this Act allows the Home Secretary the ability to issue a
certificate, one which would sanction the continuous detention, against any non-UK
national based on the fact that he believes this person is a threat to the national security
of the state and that this individual is suspected of terrorism.38 In addition to this Act,
the UK government passed a Human Rights Derogation Order in 2001. The UK found
it problematic for suspected terrorists to remain within its borders. However, article 3
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
better known as the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter the ECHR),
states that subjecting individuals to torture or other inhuman treatment is prohibited.39
Similarly, the Soering principle states that foreign individuals may not be extradited if
there is a possibility that they would be tortured or subjected to inhuman treatment.40
Passing the Derogation Order would therefore allow the government to contravene
against the existing provision in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
and against the Soering principle.41 Following the 9/11 attacks, Muslims, short-term
and long-term residents, migrants, and even citizens have suffered from the
ramifications. Integration policies and citizenship laws were reformed in a crackdown
on anyone was to their faith rather than to Europe, as if they were mutually exclusive.

36
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Muslim men, women, and children were all subjected to what European governments
and individuals considered an appropriate response to the attacks whether in schools,
workplaces, or even in their homes and communities. Xeno-racism in Europe had found
its new target and began the processes of establishing newer, harsher criteria for
integration and citizenship and securitizing their communities to ensure that their
loyalty was to Europe and that their identity fit in with the European liberal secular
identity. Under these circumstances, Muslims in Europe, particularly those coming
from migrant backgrounds, have been increasingly targeted under these newer policies
and have been victims of European states and their actors who label them as criminals
and terrorists thus justifying their violent treatment and securitization. Europe, like
many others, associated migrants with security problems thus they believed that the
best response towards them is securitization.
In a manifestation of institutional racism, Muslim migrants often find
themselves targets of policies that prevent them from integrating into societies,
naturalizing as citizens, or even freely living with their chosen faith. In fact, many
Muslims suffer through raids and questioning against their person, their homes, and
their mosques and they sometimes even suffer with being told what they can and cannot
wear. Muslim migrants in Europe find themselves on the outside of the society, where
despite being urged to integrate, they have no way of doing so due to the difficulties
imposed by the state. European countries included conditions in their integration
policies and citizenship laws that are impossible to fulfil for many of the migrants
entering Europe, especially those who enter as asylum-seekers or refugees, resulting in
migrants being stuck between their desire to integrate in this society that allowed them
entry, due to imposed obligations from the government and the general public, and their
loyalty to their identity which retained from their origin countries. In fact, because they
are treated suspiciously, Muslims in Europe have experienced varying degrees of
securitization such as restricted borders and racial profiling.42 Furthermore, Muslims
entering Europe believed they were targeted by border controls due to their religion,
and the Muslim Council of Britain reported that Muslims in the United Kingdom felt
threatened and marginalized since the 9/11 attacks. Not only that but Muslims in
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Europe were concerned about the direct effects certain policies would have on them
such as security legislations, policies that ban wearing religious symbols, and others.43
All the aforementioned examples show how Europe, despite calling for the integration
of migrants, have made them victims of policies that are more securitizing than
integrating and which make them feel more excluded than accepted.
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II: Exclusionary Reforms of Citizenship Laws and Integration Policies
Following the Second World War, and with the booming economy, many
European countries looked to immigration as the method by which labour shortages
could be reduced. Countries first looked to individuals coming from other European
countries but that was not sustainable for long. As a result, some countries, such as
France and Britain, began to look at individuals coming from their former colonies in
North Africa, South Asia, and the Caribbean. Before long, the rates of migration to
Europe increased and brought in people from far more nationalities. However, the drop
in the world economy in the 1970s meant that most migrants decided to remain in
Europe, despite the instated bans and not only that but entry of migrants into Europe
continued in the form of workers’ families and refugees.44 This process was repeated
in late 2000 when the European Commission indicated that EU countries should allow
for legal migration due to the ageing workforce and declining birthrates.45 This form of
‘managed migration’ had two results: the first was fulfilling the gap created by the need
for skilled labour and the second was leading Europe to the abolition of the right to
seek asylum.46 In response to the displacement of people due to the break-up of the
former communist zone of influence and because of globalism’s demand for free
markets and free trade from the Second and Third World countries, the First World
countries realized they had to interfere to secure their benefits. These First World
countries wanted to create an environment suitable for accumulation and establish a
new a legal and economic structure for the world economy, and they also wanted to
manage immigration by creating controls that would decide whose movement can be
free around the world and whose movement had to be restricted.47 From then on, and
because the number of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers entering Europe was
increasing, countries realized they would need to create certain controls, adopt certain
policies, and reform certain laws all in order to ensure that the newcomers they were
hosting were either dealt with appropriately, in the case of those seeking asylum which
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was considered an illegal act, or were sufficiently integrated in the hosting community,
in the case of migrants or refugees. These new policies would mark the beginning of
the securitization agenda against migrants.
As mentioned above, European countries instated certain methods of control to
deal with asylum seeking, which was considered an illegal act.48 This illegalization of
asylum seeking in Europe came about mainly in response to the anti-trafficking agendas
of First World countries. North American, Australian, and European countries have
cooperated in supranational and intergovernmental bodies to gather information on
migratory flow, and this information would then inspire the creation of regional
policies.49 Many of these bodies would gather information on migratory flows, advise
countries on preventing migration from one region to another, and even make
recommendations on dealing with issues such as trafficking and smuggling.50 This last
role was the focus of most bodies in more recent years, to the extent that the EU, the
Group of Eight industrialized nations (G8), and the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, which also includes Canada and the United States, declared the
year 2000 as the year of the ‘anti-trafficking plan’.51 This focus on trafficking meant
that displacement of people was regarded with more hostility and that the right to seek
asylum, protected by international law, was ignored.52 In fact, the Smuggling Protocol
of the 2000 United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (hereinafter
the Smuggling Protocol) states that migrants must be seen as complicit in illegal
migration.53 In article 31 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
(hereinafter the Refugee Convention), the drafters of the Convention recognized that in
some cases refugees may have to resort to illegal measures to enter a country if they
were escaping threats. Accordingly, the Convention states that such refugees may not
face penalties by State Parties so long as they report to authorities and provide a good
reason for their illegal entry.54 On the other hand, the Smuggling Protocol explicitly
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criminalizes any and all acts of migrant smuggling. This means that any individual who
is found to be helping migrants to enter a territory illegally will be subjected to criminal
prosecution.55 As a consequence, refugees, who could enter a territory illegally,
provided they have a good reason, under article 31 of the Refugee Convention could
no longer do so under the Smuggling Protocol, because any help given to them has
become a criminal offense. Therefore, the Smuggling Protocol has deprived many
migrants, seeking refuge abroad, of the options available under the Refugee Convention
and implicitly categorized them as part of the problem. Nevertheless, the antitrafficking focus of these bodies merits praise due to the dangers associated with
trafficking and smuggling and the issues that arise from it, such as sexual slavery, organ
harvesting and other acts. However, transforming the anti-trafficking agenda into a
method for criminalizing asylum creates a problematic phenomenon when asylum
seekers are automatically labelled as illegal migrants. By adopting this stance, Europe
began to securitize its asylum system. Asylum seekers became the cause of trafficking
and the subjects of this new security regime.
The right to seek asylum is an internationally recognized right that protects
individuals from the threat of persecution in their home countries. This right can be
explicitly found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in article 14(1) which
states, “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from
persecution.”56 Furthermore, the right to seek asylum can be inferred from the Refugee
Convention.57 This Convention was originally written with the events prior to 1951 in
mind, particularly the era of the Second World War when people were fleeing within
Europe. However, in 1967 a Protocol to the Convention removed the limitations
relating to time and geographical region making the Convention applicable
universally.58 This Convention is not without problems. For instance, despite the fact
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that there were refugees in Third World countries around the time of the drafting of the
Convention, these refugees were considered unimportant until the period of the Cold
War during which they were seen as having some value. This shows that even during
the time of the drafting of the Refugee Convention some refugees were considered, in
some manner, more important than others. In comparison to European refugees for
example, Third World refugees were said to be falsely claiming asylum to hide the fact
that their reason for moving was economic rather than political. Furthermore, Third
World refugees were considered different because, in most cases, they were displaced
due to an internal rather than an international conflict and this meant that the postcolonial state was to blame.59 However, the provisions of the Convention did allow for
asylum-seeking despite the aforementioned problems. Article 1(A) of the Refugee
Convention lists the conditions by which an individual can be considered a refugee
under the Convention. Subparagraph 2 of the same article states that refugees include
any individual who, “… [O]wing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of
such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”60 Additionally,
as mentioned previously, article 31(1) of the Refugee Convention states that State
Parties to the Convention should not impose penalties on any refugee who enters their
country illegally if they are coming from a territory where they have been threatened
subject to the fact that any person who enters illegally go to the authorities and provide
a good reason for their illegal entry.61 However, the official text of the Convention
states that individuals must “show good cause for their illegal entry or presence,”
however they did not define the term ‘good cause’ nor did they indicate what could
constitute as a good cause. Looking at the preparatory works of the Convention
indicated that, indeed, ‘good cause’ was not defined. However, a commentary by Dr.
Paul Weis, who participated in the preparation and adoption of the 1951 Convention

59

B.S. Chimni, The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies: A View from the South, 11 J. REFUGEE STUD., 350,
356 (1998).
60
UNHCR, supra note 54, at article 1.
61
Id., at article 31.

18

and its 1967 Protocol, showed that a refugee’s inability to legally enter any country to
escape persecution is ‘good cause’.62 However, by the time the Cold War ended,
refugees were no longer welcome in the North and this began a series of regulations
limiting asylum seekers to those who were considered normal by virtue of being white,
male, and anti-communist.63 Despite the fact that most, if not all, European countries
are State Parties to the 1951 Convention, Europe criminalized asylum seeking as part
of its anti-trafficking agenda.64 European countries began to create measures that would
work to integrate officially recognized refugees and in the meantime they would
attempt to totally exclude asylum seekers with a set of controls.65 In clear contravention
of the right to seek asylum and article 31 of the Refugee Convention, the EU intended
to establish policies that would criminalize illegal entry.66 In the United Kingdom,
asylum seekers were the subject of a system of welfare provision linked to immigration
controls rather than social care, under the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act, in
addition to a detention system which worked to contain asylum seekers and treat them
as suspected individuals.67 The 1996 Immigration and Asylum Act in the UK took away
the housing and financial support given to asylum seekers who did not manage to
declare asylum at a port of entry, therefore they had to be supported by local authorities.
These authorities were obligated to provide housing and food for the poor under the
National Assistance Act 1945 and the Children Act 1989, so they began to resent
asylum seekers who added to the burden on their budgets.68 A new Immigration and
Asylum Act in 1999 meant that asylum seeking was now an issue of immigration
control. This new act stripped asylum seekers their ability to apply for housing through
local authorities and specified that asylum seekers housed through the National Asylum
Support Service (NASS), a new body which was established to monitor the controls,
could be legally evicted with a seven day notice and without the ability for legal
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action.69 Furthermore, the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act provided that any person
who was under immigration control, such as individuals who were waiting for approval
to remain in the United Kingdom or those who were allowed to remain subject to certain
conditions, were in many cases not eligible to receive benefits such as accommodation,
healthcare, welfare provisions, or other benefits, even if homeless or destitute.70 From
1999, reports of abuse began where asylum seekers often found themselves in
overcrowded housing facilities or hostels with inedible food, inadequate sanitation, and
disregarded safety measures.71 In fact, some European countries such as France and
Sweden went further and violated the principle of non-refoulment, which states that no
person can be returned to a country where their life or freedom is threatened, by
deporting foreigners who were thought to pose a security risk.72
With regards to asylum seekers, Europe had shifted its policy towards a form
of control and expulsion. The policies they undertook were meant to cause asylum
seekers to rethink their decisions of entering Europe as they would be facing
detrimental treatment and treated like criminals. On the other hand, there were policies
of assimilation and integration, which were more targeted towards migrant workers,
officially recognized refugees, residents, and potential citizens. The EU has undertaken
several initiatives in order to better integrate migrants residing in the EU in the past few
decades. In November 2004, the Council of the European Union produced a press
release in which it outlines eleven common principles for an immigrant integration
policy in the EU, the Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the
EU. These principles maintained that integration is a two-way process requiring the
input of both immigrants and residents of the EU Member States, that integration
requires respecting EU values as well as knowledge of the host’s language and history,
that employment and education are key aspects of integration, that integration requires
immigrants have access to goods and services in a non-discriminatory manner equal to
that of national citizens, that practicing different religions and cultural norms be
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safeguarded, and more.73 Later, in 2011, the European Commission created a European
Agenda aimed at the integration of third-country nationals and called for strong and
consistent approaches to realize this goal.74 Furthermore, in 2014, the Justice and Home
Affairs Council, in line with the ongoing support of the EU towards Member States to
integrate migrants, reaffirmed the EU Common Basic Principles for Immigrant
Integration Policy adopted in 2004.75 The EU supported Member States in establishing
integration policies that fit within their national policies, yet despite the efforts, third
country national continued to face more difficulties than EU nationals76 In 2016, the
European Commission wrote the Action Plan on the Integration of Third Country
Nationals, a communication which reaffirmed the need for the effective integration of
third country national into EU states and how to achieve this integration. The Action
Plan was meant to reaffirm the EU’s commitment to integrating third country nationals,
through the investment of resources and the participation of relevant actors, in the light
of increasing discrimination and racism, in addition to upholding the fundamental rights
of the EU to achieve a more cohesive society.77 The policies set out in the Action Plan
ranged in areas from education to culture but they all were meant to support the goal of
successful integration of migrants. The policies included pre-departure and pre-arrival
measures, education, integration into the workforce and providing access to vocational
training, access to basic services, and finally, participation and social inclusion.78 The
pre-departure and pre-arrival measures are meant to help those who are relocating to
adjust to the new societies prior to their travel. Pre-departure measures focus on the
relocating individuals and how best to equip them to the new society they are entering
and they include measures such as language and job training, providing information on
the new country as well as their rights and duties, and training in other skills which
would make their integration easier. Pre-arrival measures however focus more on the
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receiving state and preparing it to welcome the newcomers and they include measures
such as the “Share City Curriculum”, a toolkit developed by SHARE Network which
was partly financed by the European Commission and which targeted the resettlement
and integration of refugees.79 Next are the education measures, and these include
language training, and also includes learning basic skills for employment and social
inclusion, educating children and providing support for the children who might need it
such as refugees, Early Childhood Education and Care (ECEC) which plays a role in
learning how different societies come together and which has proven beneficial in
addressing societal issues such as poverty and exclusion, and finally learning the values
and laws of the receiving state. In applying these policies, the European Commission
suggested the establishment of online language learning and assessment courses,
supporting children, schools, welcoming classes, low-skilled people, and the
participation of both boys and girls in ECEC.80 Employment and access to services such
as housing and health services are also some of the aims of this action plan. The
European Commission aims to recognize the qualifications of the newly entered
individuals, identify the best ways to promote entrepreneurship, provide vocational
training, and offer proper housing and health services for individuals.81 Finally, when
it comes to participation and social inclusion, the Commission suggested programs that
promote cultural diversity and social inclusion of youth, as well as promoting the
participation in political, social, and cultural life and combatting discrimination.82
Further policies undertaken by EU countries included language tests, codes of conduct,
and even reforming citizenship laws to take into account security issues.83 While these
policies on the surface seemed beneficial for the foreigners entering a European country
because they would allow them to integrate into the new community they were entering
and hereby were likely to provide them with increased safety within the host country,
they masked a hidden agenda by which host countries were attempting to move from a
society of multiculturalism to one of monoculturalism.84 Due to stereotypes practiced
by European governments, multiculturalism was associated with religious
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fundamentalism and cultural differences were associated with criminal practices.85 This
made it easier for European countries to hide the policies that would end
multiculturalism in the form of measures to eliminate religious fundamentalism and
criminal practices associated with cultural differences. With this in mind, countries
began to study why previous integration policies had failed and began establishing new
policies meant to assimilate foreigners into their communities, protect national identity,
and achieve cultural homogeneity.86 The policies outlined in both the Common Basic
Principles for Immigrant Integration and the Action Plan for Immigrant Integration are
examples of the more recent steps taken by the EU to integrate migrants. However,
these new policies are also somewhat problematic. The policies put forward by the
European Commission and the Council of Europe in both documents are idealistic, in
the sense that they provide an idea of what the desired final society will look like after
integration is complete rather than the process undertaken by the states to achieve this
integration.87 Furthermore, the EU calls for a uniform approach to integration to be
undertaken by the different states to form a coherent process of integration. However,
this is very difficult to achieve because it assumes that migrants and their host societies
are homogenous and does not take into account the different national policies of EU
Member States. Moreover, these approaches tend to neglect the different levels of
migrants, for example newcomers versus third-generation migrants, and treats them all
under the same banner.88 As a result of these problems, it is often the case that EU
Member States take different steps to achieve integration based on their respective
national policies as well as the existing society, therefore, it is often the case that some
states may have much harsher integration conditions than others which in the end makes
integration a very difficult process.
In the effort to protect the national identity of European countries, certain
aspects of identity were frowned upon: multilingualism, when languages were not
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European, and dual citizenship were viewed unfavourably.89 Some countries even
wished to restrict the citizenship rights of second- and third-degree youths while certain
measures relating to family reunification allowed states to perform an integration test
on children over twelve before allowing them entry.90 New measures established by
European countries were collectively and popularly known as an ‘integration
contract’.91 The integration contracts differed from one country to another but it was
always linked to national identity and it always made applicants for citizenship go
through certain measures to prove they have accepted European and EU values.92 One
of the most elaborate integration contracts was done by the Netherlands where it
targeted newly arrived immigrants, Dutch-born children of immigrants, and even those
who held passports from Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. The Netherlands was also the
first European country to suggest that integration should begin when migrants were still
in their country of origin by passing the Integration Abroad Act.93 However, individuals
were exempted if they held a certificate stating that they were officially integrated or if
they were citizens of EU member states, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, the United
States, New Zealand, and Japan.94 This is a clear example of the dramatic and
exaggerated response one country had to foreigners, to the extent that even those born
within the country, and those who held passports from the country’s constituencies
were considered a threat to the national identity. Not only that, but it is a display of how
Europe attempted to distinguish between those who could be ‘good’ citizens and those
who could not reach that level.95 It was the beginning of the securitization of migrants
under the banner of integration. However, not all policies undertaken by EU countries
to integrate foreigners were inherently problematic.
One of the most common policies European countries have passed to integrate
migrants into European societies was language tests. The Language Policy Unit of the
Council of Europe created a project on the linguistic integration of adult migrants
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(LIAM).96 Through this project the Language Policy Unit hoped to support European
states into creating language policies that would be based on a set of values, which
included respect for human rights.97 The Council of Europe found that the enactment
of language policies were particularly important for cases of residence and
citizenship.98 In addition, a survey conducted for the sake of the project found that
countries had in fact begun to enact such legislation for residence, citizenship, and, in
some cases, even entry, and some countries also mandated language tests for anyone
who wished to gain residency or citizenship.99 While learning the language of the host
country was a policy that is seemingly beneficial for both the foreign individuals and
the state and admirable for the sake of pursuit of knowledge, European countries, as we
have mentioned previously, discouraged multilingualism when the languages were not
European thereby making the knowledge of a non-European language a threat to the
national identity.100 Furthermore, the language requirements became much more
difficult that it excluded all but those who were highly educated.101 Another policy was
the introduction of civic tests alongside the language ones to teach potential residents
and citizens, as well as refugees, the values of European societies.102 Additionally,
applicants for citizenship had to pass a loyalty test. In Germany, this took the form of
a test that would reveal private beliefs of an individual, specifically regarding the issue
of sexuality.103 Denmark, however, took matters too far when the first LiberalConservative coalition government (2001-2006) introduced a citizenship exam so
difficult that it included language requirements so high that equated the requirements
of higher education, history questions that even parliamentarians had trouble
answering, a declaration of loyalty stating “I will work actively for the integration of
myself and my family into Danish society,” which had to be signed by citizenship
applicants, and stipulations that citizenship applicants had to work, pay taxes, not hit
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their children, and respect equality between genders.

104

This was condemned by the

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) because it assumed that
citizenship applicants would not respect the values of the society and that they would
commit the prohibited acts mentioned.105 And while the UNHCR makes a very valid
point, there are many other problems with this test. For instance, the fact that the
language requirements, which had previously been measured by the basic knowledge
of the language, has gone so high that only those who have reached the level of higher
education can pass it is quite troubling. Raising the expectations so high shows that
Denmark was clearly working towards the exclusion of a number of people who do not
have the means or the resources to attain higher education. Furthermore, the fact that
some Danish parliamentarians were unable to answer all the history questions is highly
controversial because they are not only citizens but also citizens who represent the
Danish government. The fact that Denmark expected citizenship applicants to pass a
test which its own parliamentarians had trouble with is absurd. Countries also instated
penalties for failing these tests, and they differed from one country to another. These
penalties included being forced to leave the country, paying fines, cutting social
security payments, and even limiting or losing residency rights.106 Some of these
penalties are, again, more inherently problematic than others. For example,
immigration laws that allowed the deportation of non-citizens who exhibited
‘unacceptable behaviour’ were established throughout Europe.107 In addition, new laws
allowed European countries to revoke the citizenship of an individual if he or she
displayed ‘unacceptable behaviour’. This is an indication of the state’s power of
identifying the criteria upon which an individual can be recognized as a citizen.108 It
also gives states the power to change these criteria to maximize their own interests. In
fact, states have given intelligence services the power to decide on citizenship requests,
and this power is practically unrestrained that the intelligence services do not have to
justify their reasoning for rejecting a citizenship request and the individual’s right to
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seek legal action is largely limited.109 This allows intelligence services to take
advantage of individuals seeking citizenship by persuading them into spying on their
countries as a way to establish their loyalty to the host state and therefore be afforded
citizenship. Hassan Assad, a Palestinian who is in danger of being deported from
Sweden to Jordan, believes he was refused Swedish citizenship because he refused to
act as police informer for the Swedish Security Services, and thus they accused him of
funding terrorism based on the fact that he donates money to charities in the Occupied
Palestinian territories.110
Similarly, the policies adopted in the 2016 Action Plan on the Integration of
Third-Country Nationals were not without problems. While the measures seem
advantageous theoretically, they are very hard to implement because they make many
presuppositions that may not entirely come to pass. For example, the pre-departure and
pre-arrival measures assume smooth cooperation between the country receiving the
individuals and the country of origin of the individuals. However, this cooperation,
according to the European Commission, is not developed enough.111 This makes it
much more difficult to apply these measures simultaneously, particularly when
relations between countries are unfavourable. Similarly, when it comes to education,
and social inclusion, the European Commission again presupposes certain things such
as the ability to access online courses, and the automatic acceptance of the new
individuals into their societies and children into schools. However, the reality is that
most of the time, particularly in the case of refugees, access to the Internet, the
workforce, and even schools for children as well as the general acceptance in society is
not easy. Refugees may not have the means or the resources to access certain things
such as the Internet, therefore it would become the state’s responsibility to provide
access to such means and resources, and as mentioned, many state and local authorities
believed this to be a burden. Furthermore, discrimination, as shown in the previous
chapter, is an inherent issue in many societies in Europe, therefore, to automatically
assume that migrants or refugees entering the state will be able to integrate into the
society by promoting social inclusion is unreasonable. Combatting discrimination is an
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admirable measure suggested by the European Commission, however, it is not a
measure meant for integrating migrants or refugees but a measure that must be instated
merely for the sake of being a decent society. Therefore, it is evident that the
reformations of the citizenship laws and the newly established integration policies can
be heavily criticized. The integration policies were designed in ways which allowed
Europe to determine who was acceptable for inclusion in their societies and who was
not. Because Europe tended to associate migrants with problems such as trafficking,
they began to treat them as security threats prior to their crossing European borders.
Europe’s attempt to force migrants into integrating because their fears pertaining to
crimes but also cultural heterogeneity and the loss of national identity caused them to
establish integration policies that were so outrageous making it harder for migrants to
integrate, which created an “integration paradox”.112 And even though these policies
are meant to apply to anyone who falls within the European countries’ radar, those who
are most affected were minorities and particularly Muslims who had to face these
issues, especially after the 9/11 attacks, and who have since faced securitization in their
places of work, schools, communities, and even clothing. The integration policies
masked security policies that explicitly targeted Muslim migrants under the guise of
preventing radicalization and therefore protecting public order. Europe used integration
to hide its agenda of securitizing and alienating certain groups of people.
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III: Europe’s Attitude Towards Muslim Migrants
Since the 9/11 attacks, Muslims in Europe have been the subject of various
security discussions and policies that aim to deradicalize them if they were to stay in
Europe. In fact, the importance of the security agenda increased exponentially
following the 9/11 attacks and national security became a term widely spread to ensure
that the public understood that this security agenda was for their benefit.113 The
securitization of Muslims in Europe, since then, took many forms. The effects of the
integration paradox, the consequence of integration policies which in practice made it
harder for migrants to integrate, meant that Muslim migrants were often treated as
suspect communities in need of securitization. Borders became an essential institution,
necessary to segregate people based on social conditions using passports or identity
cards as a systematic criterion.114 Integration policies were akin to a physical wall
erected to intercept national security threats, and now these walls have evolved into a
non-physical form meant to limit the movement of people, including migrants, and to
stop the dilution of the national identity that would result from the entry of those racially
or ethnically different.115 Border controls and integration policies are entangled with
the security agenda to keep those inside the state protected and those outside
excluded.116 As a consequence, governments began to increasingly target Muslim
people and communities in their War Against Terror and the general public wanted to
distance themselves from those who belonged to the Muslim faith. Individuals residing
in Europe felt the change in treatment towards them. One person living in Britain
explained it as, “… if you are Muslim then people don’t want to know you and with all
the propaganda to do with Islam at the moment,” while another said, “We feel like
outsiders in our own country…. Because before I was part of a community, whether
there was integration or not that is completely irrelevant. I was part of a community, a
British community in England. Now I am part of a criminal element in Bradford.”117
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Not only did they have to go through the same integration policies that other migrants
had to go through, but Muslims, both residents and newcomers, have also had to bear
the brunt of attacks on their person, their homes, their assets, and even their mosques.118
Securitization occurred through monitoring, as is the case in educational institutions,
where European security forces observe Muslims for any sign of radicalization because
it was expected of them. Security forces in European countries also raided Muslim
communities and homes with the belief that they were harbouring terrorists or that the
residents in these homes are involved in terrorism plots, most of the time with no proof
of these accusations. Additionally, securitization took the form of legislations meant to
restrict Muslim migrants from practicing their beliefs peacefully, as is the case of the
ban on religious symbols, which hid the true agenda of the European desire to ban
Muslim women from wearing the veil. All these forms of securitization show how
Europe has managed to alter its course from purely integration to a combination of
integration and securitization with an emphasis on securitization because Europe
believed that Muslim migrants could not be trusted to fully embrace European values
and European society. Not only that, but this response to Muslim migrants helped
Europe further their campaign towards shifting away from multiculturalism and
allowed Muslims to be labelled as dangerous, criminals, or terrorists making them easy
targets for Europe’s fight against terrorism. Europe’s disproportionate response to
Muslims within their territories created a sense of paranoia where anything different is
considered dangerous and Muslims were not exempt. European countries have created
policies that limit Muslims from living a harmonious life. The religious profiling of
Muslims in Europe has affected their lives within their homes, their work environment,
their education, their clothing, and even their ability to manifest their religion. In the
midst of calls for integration, Muslims in Europe who are targeted in the widespread
security policies and the securitization agenda are more likely to disintegrate and more
likely to respond to the distrust they face by radicalization.119
Because of the threat Europe associates with Muslims, security and intelligence
forces began to increasingly target Muslims, particularly male youth, due to the belief
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that they are vulnerable to radicalization and therefore must be placed under the
purview of anti-terrorism laws.120 For instance, Muslim youth are considered potential
threats, regardless of their level of educations. In fact, studies have showed that higher
level of educations makes migrants more sensitive and more aware of discrimination
against them.121 Those educated understand the problems facing Muslims worldwide
and increased their awareness of inequalities and prejudice therefore they likely to be
alert to racism and discrimination but it also makes them more prone to be recruited by
Islamic groups in universities. On the other hand, less educated youth can be recruited
by jihadi groups, extremist preachers, and even online groups because they can often
be alienated due to their religion and their low level of education.122 Looking into issues
that are considered ‘anti-social’ or ‘undesirable’ such as extremist views on books or
other forms of media meant that Muslim youth are subjected to anti-terrorist laws.123 In
fact, some universities in the EU were instructed by their governments to subject
foreign Muslim students to extra surveillance. A 2005 report titled ‘When Students
Turn to Terror: Terrorism and Extremist Activity on British Campuses’ identified
certain educational institutions as breeding grounds for terrorist activities. It also
recommended that educational institutions cooperate with MI5 and allow plain-clothed
officers onto campuses to monitor students.124 This report led to several
recommendations and advices to educational institutions such as guidelines to target
violent extremism, guidelines to deal with extremist literature, and ways to monitor
religious student organizations and separate the moderate from the radical.125 And
while some of these recommendations are useful in the sense that it can help
universities understand what may cause the radicalization of otherwise moderate
students and attempt to address the root cause of such radicalization, most of these
recommendations are ridiculous in the sense that Muslims are automatically considered
threats and potential terrorists. These recommendations are recognizing Muslims as the
problem rather than acknowledging the need to look at the reasons why they are
radicalized, and they are accepting that the best way to implement anti-terrorist laws in
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campuses is to completely violate the privacy of these Muslim students by spying on
them and treating them like criminals before a crime is committed. These
recommendations neglect the surrounding factors that may lead to Muslims becoming
radical and are ironically, they are calling for actions that may on the long-run lead to
more radicalization. In fact, a 2008 case commonly known as ‘The Case of the
Nottingham Two’ is an example where a similar recommendation to monitor students
in universities completely backfired. This case follows two individuals in the
University of Nottingham, British master’s student of Pakistani descent, Rizwaan
Sabir, and Algerian staff member, Hicham Yezza, who had resided in the UK for 13
years.126 Sabir was on a graduate track which would expect him to begin his Ph.D. once
he completed his MA. His research for his MA dissertation revolved around Al Qaeda
in Iraq and radicalization topics and as part of his research, he often consulted with
Yezza who was a friend of his as well as a junior administrator for the School of Modern
Languages in the University of Nottingham.127 Because of this friendship, Sabir sent
three documents related to his research to Yezza so that he may print them for him,
which were later found by another administrator, a colleague of Yezza who he allowed
access to his computer while he was away from work. One of the documents found on
the computer was ‘The Al Qaeda Training Manual’ which constituted part of Sabir’s
research into Al Qaeda and radicalization.128 Sabir accessed this document through the
United States Department of Justice website, and in fact, it could have been ordered
through an inter-library loan system at the University of Nottingham’s library and in
2011 a copy was made available at the library.129 Because of their possession of this
document, Sabir and Yezza were arrested and questioned for six days.130 Both
individuals were released with no charges, however Yezza was later re-arrested for
immigration offenses because his visa had run out.131 While the senior management of
the University of Nottingham was reluctant to allow Sabir to remain, he managed to
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complete his MA under the assumption that he would then be beginning his Ph.D.
However in order to do so he had to receive a mark of 60 percent of above, which he
did not manage to do ending up with a mark of 58.3 percent which, had it been 0.2
percent higher, could have been rounded up to 59 percent and from there to 60 percent
under his school’s regulations. The Head of the School, Professor Heywood, sent an
email to different actors at the university, including the Vice-Chancellor and the Dean,
informing them of Sabir’s MA marks and how they could not be rounded up, and
therefore proposed that Sabir be informed that he could not be awarded a place in the
Ph.D. program.132 However, it was later found that Sabir’s initial acceptance required
him to achieve a passing mark, 50 percent, on his MA to be eligible for a place in the
Ph.D. program. Upon learning this, Professor Heywood sent another email to the same
list of people which stated, “Further to my message of last week, I have learned today
– to my considerable irritation – that the offer letter to Rizwaan Sabir simply stipulated
a pass at MA, rather than the School’s usual standard of at least 60% …[this]… none
the less leaves us with no grounds to refuse entry.”133 While Sabir began his Ph.D. at
Nottingham, he was advised to start another Ph.D. in another university because the
management at Nottingham would not be helping him, advice which Sabir took and
began a Ph.D. in Strathclyde University despite initially not wanting to leave
Nottingham.134 While this case also outlines some of the problems with the
management of the University of Nottingham, the key issue presented here is that the
increased monitoring of Muslims, without understanding the context and not bothering
to question the motives, led to assumptions being made that these Muslims were
involved in terrorist activities. This in turn led to the baseless arrest of two individuals,
one whose future might under different circumstance have ended, because security
forces advised that a good way to prevent terrorism and radicalization would be spying
on minorities.
It wasn’t only educational institutions where intelligence and security forces
targeted Muslims, but also mosques and homes. Intelligence services believed that
mosques were places where Muslims went to for jihadist networks and radicalization
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occurred, and the media often portrayed mosques as places where hate was spread.135
The portrayals of Muslims in different media forms has also influenced the way of
thinking of politicians who link Muslims’ failure to accept Western identities to the
spread of terrorism, and who believe that radicalization and terrorism in Muslims is a
result of failing to integrate and the failing multicultural society, which they believe
produces the enemies arising from within.136 Security forces labelled foreign Muslim
preachers, or imams, as a risk because their teachings in mosques were believed to
catalyze youth radicalization.137 The media expanded on this belief by reporting on a
number of imams who were in fact guilty of radicalization, such as Najm Faraj Ahmad,
a Kurdish imam in Norway who was arrested for his Taliban-style teachings, and
Finsbury Park imam Abu Hamza al-Masri, who was arrested for inciting murder and
racial hatred; a scare tactic used to show the public the dangers Islam has on Western
societies and identities.138 Consequently, journalists began to enter mosques believing
that they will be able to uncover nefarious terrorism plots, and often their recordings or
photographs are used by security forces to justify raids on mosques and mosque-goers,
despite distortions or incomprehensibility, and are sometimes used as evidence in the
security forces’ cases against imams.139 Germany’s intelligence services takes matters
slightly further and monitors all Muslim organizations, even the non-violent ones,
labeling them as ‘Islamist’ because they go against German ideals and can likely lead
to radicalization.140 Raids escalated beyond mosques to include homes of Muslims in
the community. In Spain, one individual, Smail Boudjelthia, reported that he was
awoken by the door being blown open thinking there was a fire and that those who
entered were firefighters, but was forced face-down by armed police and questioned
about how many times he visits the local mosque and accused of being linked to
terrorist groups.141 This accusation stemmed from the belief that Boudjelthia knew an
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al-Qaeda suspect in a case which the French had requested Spanish help from.
Boudjelthia had admitted that this suspect stayed in the same apartment he did, however
he also said that most Algerians who arrive in Banyoles stay in the same place and that
the local Red Cross often brings Algerians there asking for help.142 Some reports even
discussed police breaking into homes where women, children, and pregnant women
resided.143 For example, a family of three, including an 18-month old girl found
themselves in a similar situation when police raided their home, accusing the father,
Mohammed Nabbar, of leading and giving orders in a terrorist group. Several items
taken from Nabbar’s house such as bottles containing cologne and cooking oils, his
daughter’s medicine, alarm clocks, and manuals used by Nabbar to learn about
electronics were presented as evidence that he was helping plan a terrorist attack.144
Several Muslim organizations criticized increased police violence against Muslims and
Muslim communities and explained how the actions of security and intelligence
services

are

harming

cooperation

between

organizations

and

government

institutions.145 These organizations condemned terrorism but they also outline how
unreasonable it is to blame an entire community for the actions of a few.146 And in fact,
this is what Muslims often have to suffer through. The actions of a few are almost
always held over the entire Muslim community whether they agree with them or not.
Additionally, the disproportionate response from governments often means the
Muslims may be held accountable for actions that not only did they have no knowledge
of, but also actions which they wholeheartedly disagree with. Furthermore, government
responses where Muslims are labeled as criminals or terrorists often do more harm than
good. The above examples show how Muslims are often accused of terrorism-related
crimes with little to no evidence and because of incomplete accounts, and this
generalization, combined with responses of violence, arrests, and imprisonment, can
lead to the exact thing that intelligence and security forces are attempting to fight with
anti-terrorism laws. However, securitizing Muslims does not stop at monitoring their
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day-to-day activities, spying on their education, or raiding their cultural spaces, it even
goes so far as to control the way Muslims dress in public.
One of the policies that have increasingly affected Muslim women in Europe is
the veil ban. Religion is what Europe considers the biggest hindrance to the complete
integration that could be achieved by newcomers due to secularism and the belief of
some that religion is not fundamental.147 As such, it made sense for European countries
to establish legislations by which major displays of religion were prohibited, and by
doing so, they would eliminate the obvious or apparent hindrance, forcing new-comers
into the first step towards integration. This was also considered important to address
the issue of divided loyalties displayed by new-comers who held an attachment to their
own identity.148 The veil ban does not only prevent women from manifesting their
chosen religion in the way they prefer, but it also affects their ability to receive an
education, in the case of younger girls, or their ability to work, in the case of older
women. The veil ban is a constant topic of discussion in Europe and is often explored
under the banner that the veil is a tool used by Muslim men to oppress Muslim women,
therefore, it is always associated with negative connotations and subsequently must be
banned.149 France’s President in 2009, Nicholas Sarkozy, stated that the burqa was not
a religious problem but one regarding liberty and dignity and he equated the burqa to a
symbol of subservience and debasement.150 Because of these beliefs, many Westerners
believe that they must “liberate” veil and burqa-wearing women therefore they give
support to bans on these forms of dress.151 It would be ignorant to say that all women
who wear the veil have chosen to do so, because some are in fact forced into wearing
it due to societal, familial, or even state pressures. However, it is as equally ignorant to
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believe that if some women are forced into wearing the veil then that must mean that
all women who wear it are forced into doing to. Subscribing to this belief creates
problems and calls into question those Muslim women who attempt to come out and
declare that they have chosen to wear the veil or the burqa, therefore, Muslim women
generally are often not asked to give their opinion on the matter.152 However, some
have come out in the defense of how the veil can be a choice. Freelance writer Hanna
Yusuf describes the veil as a symbol of emancipation from societies that objectify
women. She does not specifically say that the veil in and of itself is emancipatory,
seeing as it is an article of clothing, just as nudity is not liberating, but that the choice
to wear it is what makes it so. Additionally, Professor Leila Ahmed, a distinguished
Islamic feminist whose analysis on the veil won her the University of Louisville
Grawemeyer Award in Religion, has said that Muslim women in the West are choosing
to wear the veil for their own reasons rather for ones imposed on them by others.153
Another commonly considered reason for applying prohibitions on the veil relates to
integration within European societies, and this reason is often raised when it comes to
the face-veil.154 Despite the facts that Muslims have been migrating to Europe
throughout the last few decades, if not longer, immigration of Muslims is viewed almost
resentfully throughout the region and legal bans on the veil were justified as a way of
integrating the minorities into the West and adapting them to Western traditions.155 The
ban on the veil has gained support, because it meant an embrace of secularism and the
exclusion of religion, and as mentioned previously, it safeguarded women’s rights. In
addition, some people considered the veil a symbol of religious fundamentalism and
saw it as a threat to public security, therefore they supported the ban.156 Similarly, there
were those who supported the face-veil ban because it hindered the principle of “living
together”. This principle is based on the fact that because the face is a major part of
communication, the face-veil inhibits those wearing it and the public from
communicating and interacting therefore limiting their ability to participate in
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society.157 In fact, in S.A.S. v. France, the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter
the ECtHR) considered the full-face veil a valid exercise of religion yet it prevented
people in France from “living together”. While “living together” on its own was not a
valid reason to limit the rights of religious freedom and freedom to manifest beliefs,
found in Article 8 and 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Court found
that it was an element that can be found within the protection of the rights of others. As
such, if a woman wears a full face-veil and covers her face, she can be found to be in
breach of the right of others to socialization and this would make “living together” more
difficult.158 This concept brings about a double standard where some policies taken by
states do in fact hinder the idea of “living together”. For example, gentrification is
undertaken by many states to turn low-income neighbourhoods into neighbourhoods
more attractive to the middle-class in order to appear more developed and to achieve
more racial and economic integration. However, this process, in turn, leads to the
displacement of lower income residents who will no longer be able to reside in these
neighbourhoods due to the increased economic value.159 This shows a double standard
in the sense that gentrification displaces many people making it harder for different
people to “live together” but the process is undertaken regardless because on the surface
it assumes the integration of different social classes and creates the appearance of
harmonious societies therefore it is considered beneficial, despite the harm to the lives
of those displaced. However, when Muslim women wear the face veil, they are
considered to be harming society because the belief is that they are unable to socialize
enough to realize the concept of “living together”. The issue becomes that wearing the
veil does not conform to European values and identities. It is in fact considered a
hindrance because it does not allow women who wear it to fully and effectively
integrate into society. A common European conception that has a colonial history is
that the veil is a tool used by Muslim men force women to be subordinate, accordingly
the veil ban represents the emancipation of the oppressed Muslim women in the
European imagination. And because of their disregard for women who wear the veil
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voluntarily, and that the veil violates European values of secularism, liberalism, and
women’s rights, European courts have received a fair share of cases regarding the veil.
Similar to the above examples of the securitization of Muslims in educational
institutions, mosques, and homes, Muslim women have battled their right to wear the
veil in education institutions and workplaces in European courts, both national and
regional.
The first known legislation that included a ban on veils was a law passed in
France in 2004, Law 2004-228 of 15 March 2004, which prohibits the wearing of
religious symbols in French public schools.160 When drafting the law, French President
Jacques Chirac and a government advisory commission intended it to ban conspicuous
religious symbols which would have included Islamic headscarves, large Christian
crosses, Jewish skullcaps, and Sikh turbans, which were not included in the drafts but
were likely to be included in the legislation.161 Minister of National Education, Luc
Ferry, stated that the law intended to do more than ban such symbols and would require
students to accept what is taught on the Holocaust and attend biology and physical
education classes. This came amidst complains from teachers regarding Muslim
students’ rejection of the Nazi slaughtering of the Jews, Muslim girls boycotting classes
on human reproduction for being too graphic, demands for gender-segregated physical
education classes, requests for prayer breaks during final examinations, and calls for a
ban on pork in school cafeterias.162 While Ferry did not intend to single out Muslim
students, he did not have to as most Jewish-Orthodox students who would have
participated in similar complaints attended private Jewish schools where such issues
were not present.163 The consequences of enacting the ban led to several expulsions of
minors, mostly Muslim girls.164 France reported that in the first year of the Act’s
implementation 39 students were expelled while French newspaper Le Monde reported
that it was in fact 47 students who were excluded and a further 96 who chose not to
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return. Throughout the years less and less students chose to wear prohibited attire;
however controversy arose when one 15-year old Muslim girls was expelled for
wearing a headband and a long skirt which were considered to be too religious.165 It is
easier to study the impact of the veil ban on Muslim female students, on account of
their numbers, however it is not only students in educational institutions that are
affected by such prohibitions but also Muslim women in the workplace, including
teachers. Muslim teachers wearing the veil have been subjected to problems due to the
enactment of similar legislations. In Dahlab v. Switzerland, a Swiss primary school
teacher was prohibited from wearing the headscarf during her professional duties by
the Director General of Public Education.166 This case was presented to the European
Court of Human Rights which declared that the headscarf seemed to be forced on
women by the Quran and that it did not fit with the values of gender equality.
Furthermore, it confirmed the findings of the Swiss Federal Court that the veil cannot
be reconciled with the values that must be embodied by teachers in a democratic society
and presented to their students, such as tolerance, respect for others and equality and
non-discrimination.167 Given that the ECtHR was trying to spread a message of
embracing tolerance, it is quite ironic that in spreading tolerance they reinforced a
prohibition on an individual’s choice of expression and identity which is quite literally
the opposite of tolerance. However, this is also not surprising as the veil, as Europeans
have deemed it, seems to be offensive and threatening to the European identity,
therefore they find it necessary to restrain this threat against European values. In
Germany, a similar situation took place where a German of Afghan origins, Fereshta
Ludin, presented her case to municipal and state courts after her application to become
a teacher was rejected by the Board of Education in the state of Baden-Württemberg,
in 1998, because her headscarf identified her as belonging to the Islamic faith.168 Ludin
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lost all her cases and in 2002, the German Federal Administrative Court in Berlin stated
that teachers must not display any religious symbols in class because they act as state
representatives. However, in 2003, the Federal Constitutional Court, Germany’s
highest court, overruled this ruling and said that Stuttgart school authorities should not
have barred Ludin from teaching while wearing the veil because no such legal ban was
enacted in Baden-Württemberg. The court also said that if states did not wish to employ
teachers wearing the veil then an unambiguous law banning religious symbols in
classrooms must be enacted. As a result of the court’s statement, German states’
education ministers put out statement that they were planning to enact such legislation.
In 2004, when Baden-Württemberg enacted said legislation, the High Courts had to
determine whether it was constitutional, the proper interpretation of religious symbols,
and whether the legislation was exclusively aimed at Muslim teachers. The Federal
Administrative Court ruled that the legislation enacted in Baden-Württemberg was
unfair because it applied strictly to Muslim women; the Court stated that, “exceptions
for certain forms of religiously motivated clothing … [was] out of the question.”169
Since then, half of Germany’s federal states have enacted legislation that bans teachers
in public schools from wearing religious symbols, and in the case of Berlin and Hesse,
this ban also extends to public employees in the justice and law enforcement fields.
Additionally, many of the German state that enacted these legislations have created an
exception for Christian clothing and symbols because they conform to and represent
Christian-Western values and traditions.170 While at first glance, it seemed that the
German Federal Constitutional Court upheld Ludin’s right, and the rights of other
women in similar positions, to manifest her religious beliefs in the way she chooses, it
in fact created a loophole and presented the idea to German states that if they wish to
ban veil-wearing women from the workplace, then legislations must reflect this ban.
This loophole allowed a number of German states to enact a ban on wearing the veil by
teachers and other public employees, not only that, but it encompassed all religious
symbols, with the exception of Christian clothing and symbols because those are
considered representative of European identities. However, educational institutions are
not the only places where such bans take place, whether against students or teachers,
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but they occur in workplaces and other cultural spaces as well. Similar cases have also
happened in Belgium, where a workplace banned an employee from wearing the veil,
and in France, where an employee was fired for wearing the veil due to a customer
complaint. Both employees appealed to the European Court of Justice for their cases
and the Court stated that headscarves may be banned in the workplace if employers
have a general ban on political, philosophical, or religious symbols. Because the
employers in the Belgian case had such a ban, the employee’s dismissal was upheld.
However, in France, the dismissal was not upheld because it was based on a customer’s
complaint and it was not a non-discriminatory occupational requirement.171 However,
in some cases it is the interpretation of the laws that causes unresolved questions
regarding the legality of prohibitions on the veil. For example, in 2002, the German
Federal Labour Court decided that a saleswoman should not have been fired from her
job for wearing a veil yet, in 2014, the same court ruled that church employers could
forbid employees from wearing the Muslim veil. Additionally, in 2015, the German
Constitutional Court ruled that headscarf bans for teachers in state-funded schools were
unconstitutional because they did not threaten to impair the peace at school, a ruling
they affirmed in 2016.172 Therefore, it seems like a large part of the problem is that
there is no clear-cut understanding of how the prohibition should be enacted, or even
why the prohibition is enacted at all.
Additionally, Muslim women who wear the veil have been prevented from
participating in leisure activities, particularly in France, due to the prohibition of the
veil. Mennel Ibtissem, a participant in the singing contest, the Voice, was ostracized
for appearing in the contest wearing a hijab. The aforementioned contestant’s decision
to appear wearing the veil unnerved many people to the extent that they began to
campaign against her. Going through her social media presence, they discovered that
she had showed support of conspiracy theories about terror attacks in France, but they
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failed to realize that she was only twenty years old, and they failed to scrutinize other
similar-aged people’s social media in the same way to see what they supported. Due to
these circumstances, and the ongoing witch-hunt against her, Ibtissem decided to
withdraw from the competition.173 Furthermore, in 2016, French mayors across the
country attempted to ban Muslim women from wearing full-body swimsuits, more
commonly known as burkinis, with anti-burkini decrees, and beginning with the
cancellation of a burkini event at a theme park in Marseilles. Then-Prime Minister
Manuel Valls supported the ban and claimed that the burkini was provocative and
archaic.174 A famous incident related to the anti-burkini decrees involved four armed
policemen approaching a woman on a beach in Nice and forcing her to remove some
items of clothing in order to comply with the ban, as well as issuing her an on-the-spot
fine.175 However, women have lately taken to protesting the burkini bans in France. In
an early-2019 campaign named “Operation Burkini” Muslim women, inspired by Rosa
Parks, defied the burkini-ban by going swimming in two different public pools amidst
support from other swimmers. While the women were apprehended by police, fined,
and banned from using public pools for one month, they, according to the Citizens
Alliance of Grenoble, attempted to challenge a situation where women had to choose
between their religious beliefs and accessing public spaces. The city closed down both
pools involved in the incident and statements by the city hall spokesperson and mayor
Eric Piolle described the protestors as using “tactics of shock and buzz”.176 Also earlier
this year, a French sportswear company was forced to suspend the sale of a sports
jogging hijab it produced in Morocco because it received backlash from politicians and
on social media calling it a violation of French secular values and because they feared
for the safety of their staff who were insulted and threatened on social media.177 It seems
that France is moving towards an elimination of veil-wearing Muslim women from the

173

Diallo, supra note 149.
Id.
175
Id.; Brayson, supra note 154, at 55.
176
Andy Gregory “French city closes public swimming pools after Muslim women defy burkini ban in
protest,” The Independent, Jun. 28, 2019, available at:
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/swimming-pool-closed-burkini-ban-francegrenoble-muslim-protest-a8978836.html.
177
Inti Landauro, “French sports store pulls hijab for women joggers over furor,” Reuters, Feb. 27,
2019, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-hijab/french-sports-store-pulls-hijab-forwomen-joggers-over-furor-idUSKCN1QG2EG.
174

43

public sphere. France has certainly been the most committed European country when
it comes to enacting prohibitions on the veil, and it also seems to be setting a precedent
for other countries.
It is not surprising that Europe has taken such a stance against Muslims, whether
they are citizens or migrants, even though migrants may face more backlash for being
non-European. The above examples show that Europe’s racism, which has been one of
the themes upon which it has been built, continues to live on despite the end of
colonialism. During the colonial era racism took the form of anti-blacks, Europe itself
had cases of anti-Semitism and ethnic cleansing, and now it has taken the same stance
against Muslims who seem to be threating the European identity and European values.
That is not to say that Muslims’ native countries are perfect, in fact many countries
have their own problems. For example, it is no secret that many women in Muslimmajority countries are in fact forced into wearing the veil, and that there is a strong
cultural emphasis on the role of women in these societies, resulting in many of these
women struggling to emancipate themselves from these expectations and, in many
cases, struggling to fight for their right to dress how they want. This is evident for
example in the social media movement started by Masih Alinejad, an Iranian woman,
who protested the mandatory veil. Alinejad posted an unveiled picture of herself on
Facebook which began a series of posts from herself and other Iranian women who all
wanted to feel the same freedom of being allowed to unveil. With the influx of response
from other women, Alinejad began a campaign called ‘My Stealthy Freedom’ as a way
to showcase how women in Iran had to struggle to achieve some semblance of freedom
when it comes to the veil. 178 This example shows how women in Iran, and countless
women in different parts of the world, are struggling for the ability to be free in their
home countries. Therefore, it would be remiss to say that Muslim-majority countries
are without similar problems; however, it is the idea that in escaping similar societies
in the hope of finding a better life, Muslims traveling to Europe are still scrutinized and
profiled. It is not only that their rights are violated for the sole reason that they are
Muslim but also that they are accused of being offenders and lawbreakers. It is the idea
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that because they are Muslim this means that they are a danger to Europe and that their
identity automatically makes them evil. Europe has placed so much emphasis on their
whiteness, their secularism, and their liberalism, that any other identity is deemed nonEuropean and not capable of being European. Racism, fascism, xeno-racism, and all
other forms of discrimination Europe practices is their way of ensuring that the
European identity remains protected and that no threats can harm this identity in
anyway. It does not matter that this identity was a product of slave trading or genocide,
what is important is that the European identity was superior then and that it continues
to remain superior today.
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Conclusion
With the influx of migrants, Europe began a new securitization program
targeting non-Europeans entering the continent. Many European countries established
policies that appear to integrate but actually aim to securitize migrants, especially in
the case of Muslim migrants in Europe. Europe’s colonial and racist history haunts
today’s migration law and policy. It would be remiss to say that the 9/11 attack were
the sole reason why Muslim migrants have faced increased securitization, however it
was, without a doubt, a catalyst. Scholars have discussed the effect of the 9/11 attacks
and the legislation passed in response on immigration and integration policies. Post9/11 found a development in border control, an increase in anti-terrorism and antitrafficking measures, and exclusionary policies towards migrants, as well as an
increased fear of migrants and the rise of anti-migrant groups.179 Today, Muslim
migrants are particularly impacted by sinister immigration laws, especially after the
9/11 attacks when attitudes towards Muslims shifted to hatred and distrust. After 9/11
many new immigration policies were passed and were as a whole known as the
“securitization of immigration governance.”180 Under this banner, Western
governments, political parties, the general public, and the media began to perceive
immigration as a security problem.181 In response, the Europe Union adopted
integration policies and citizenship laws which theoretically aimed to help migrants
assimilate into new societies, but in reality, these laws and policies where too difficult
to fulfil making it harder for migrants to integrate and effectively made them excluded.
The Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the EU is one of the
examples of the EU’s approach to integration. In theory, the implementation of these
principles would have been a positive and significant step towards the integration of
migrants in the EU. These Principles call for the input of both immigrants and
governments as well as giving immigrants access to goods and services like any natural
citizen and also allowing for different religious practices with no-discrimination.
However, the actual policies being applied in the EU differ greatly than what the
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Common Basic Principles have called for.

Governments began to think of the

integration of migrants as a step towards limiting multiculturalism and towards curbing
the perceived threats that migrants may cause otherwise. Furthermore, the expectations
of government officials and migrants when it pertains to integration are quite different.
Government officials emphasize the importance of migrants to exhibit loyalty and
conform to the identities of the dominant. In other words, government officials, more
prominently those in Europe, want migrants from minorities to reject their own
identities and replace them with the identities of the majority. On the other hand,
migrants believe that integration means that they are accepted into society with the
addition of being able to retain their own identities while living in harmony and
respecting the existent dominant identities.182 Consequently, the worrying over the
harmonization within society and the fear of disintegration forced governments to adopt
integration policies that are inherently exclusionary.183 This does not only put
governments and migrants into a never-ending cycle of trying to include those they
excluded but it also causes problems between minority migrants who are unsure of what
is expected from them and majority citizens who believe migrants are unwilling to
integrate. As a result, Muslim migrants are often judged based on their religious identity
because Europeans are under the impression that they are not fully loyal to the state
that has accepted them.184 Maintaining a religious identity is linked to unwillingness to
integrate by the European general public, therefore, exhibiting loyalty to the Muslim
identity translates to the same thing. In fact, in 2006, Europeans from different countries
believed that Muslims preferred being separate from society.185 Therefore, it is evident
that an element of identity factors in with the potential integration and securitization of
Muslim migrants. Given that Europe believes that religious identities are a hindrance
towards full integration, it is not strange that the established integration policies and
citizenship laws require migrants to demonstrate their willingness of forgoing religious
teachings in order to be fully integrated. This is evident when it comes to integration
policies such as those in Germany where migrants were tested on their beliefs regarding
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issues such as sexuality.186 Such tests are designed to determine those suited for
inclusion in the society and those who are considered unfitting of the standards of
European society, mainly because Europe anticipates that they will not be able to
conform or display loyalty to European values and ideals and because of the widespread
association between Muslims and criminal activity. In response, European
governments delegated certain tasks to security forces, making it the role of security
forces to determine whether migrants were capable of integrating or not. Security forces
then took the opportunity to begin monitoring these migrants. This took place in
schools, universities, homes, public spaces, and elsewhere. The association established
between Muslim migrants and criminal activity was often reported in the media,
sometimes at the behest and with encouragement from security forces and other times
through investigative journalists who infiltrated Muslim spaces such as mosques and,
with no understanding of the Muslim faith, assumed that Muslims gathered for
nefarious reasons. These reports often influenced the thoughts and beliefs of the general
public towards Muslims and often resulted in raids by security forces against Muslims
and Muslim spaces with little to no evidence of criminal activity. Not only that, but
Muslim women in Europe are even told how they must dress to become a part of
European society.
Theoretically, it appears that the European Union wants to attempt to make migrants
feel welcome and help them assimilate and become a part of European society. The
approaches undertaken by the European Union in order to integrate migrants, such as
the Common Basic Principles of Immigrant Integration Policy and the Action Plan on
the Integration of Third Country Nationals include several points and actions that EU
countries are meant to take to achieve successful integration of migrants. However, in
practice, EU countries are passing their own integration policies which may or may not
include the policies included in the Common Basic Principles and the Action Plan,
despite both being created to facilitate integration. As such it can often be the case that
countries establish policies much harsher than what the European Commission had
anticipated in both documents. This thesis outlines several problems that can be found
in the European Union’s approach to integration and several problems in the national
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policies for integration in different countries. National policies often neglected certain
aspects from the Common Basic Principles of Immigrant Integration Policy such as the
need to allow immigrants access to goods and services equal to that of natural citizens,
and that their religious and cultural practices should be safeguarded. In fact, EU
countries were participating in a crackdown against migrants, including Muslim
migrants, under the guise of integration because they fear that migrants have brought
in dangers that must be resolved before they manifest. This thesis does not aim to offer
solutions to the issues of securitization or integration. However, it problematizes the
European Union’s vision of migrant integration and the harmonious society envisioned
by showing that while the EU approach to integration seems ideal it in fact neglects
certain facts crucial to integration such as different levels of migrants and differences
in national policies. Because of this, it is no surprise that migrants experience very
difficult measures to integrate, some more than others. The European Commission
envisioned a uniform policy of integration, however, it also tasked countries with
creating national policies for integration. As a result, some countries took advantage of
this and created national policies for integration that disguised the agenda for
securitization. Migrants who have managed to escape their countries due to conflicts,
lack of opportunities, or even for the simple wish to survive have become the
scapegoats for public disorders, terrorism, radicalization and other crimes Europe has
associated with them. In its fight towards equality for all, Europe has managed to
legitimize the isolation and exclusion as well as increase the securitization of a group
of people who have little to no ways of fighting back.
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